I investigate to what degree differences in retraining opportunities are responsible for the divergence of unemployment rates between the U.S. and Europe since the early 1980s. I provide some evidence for higher retraining rates in the U.S. as compared to Europe and further show that there is tremendous heterogeneity across OECD countries with respect to retraining. In my model, unemployed workers not only search for jobs but also for suitable retraining programs. I find that when it becomes more difficult to find suitable retraining programs, enrollment rates, productivity and the unemployment rate decline. Furthermore, this paper is the first attempt to investigate the role of retraining in economies that are subject to economic turbulences as described by Sargent (1998, 2004). Using a similar parametrization as Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004) , I find that the generosity of unemployment benefits, the main driving force in their model, is not an important determinant of unemployment, even during tumultuous economic times, if sufficiently good retraining institutions are available. Economies with more flexible retraining institutions adjust better to economic turbulence, and as a result, feature lower unemployment rates and higher productivity and output. My results suggest that differences in retraining opportunities play an important role in explaining cross-country differences in unemployment rates. * I thank Robert E. Hall for his generous support and outstanding advice and guidance throughout this project. I further thank Pete Klenow, Narayana Kocherlakota, Masaki Nakabayashi, and Michèle Tertilt for helpful discussions.
Introduction
Unemployment in Europe started to emerge as a problem in the early 1980s. For the prior three decades, the unemployment rate in Europe was considerably lower than that in the United States. Since 1983, however, Europe has had consistently higher unemployment rates than the U.S., reaching levels as high as 11 percent in the early 1990s (see Figure 1) . The timing and magnitude of this increase, however, varies greatly across countries. While some countries experienced a sharp increase in unemployment from the 1970s to the 1980s, others experienced similar increases only one decade later. Some of the countries that experienced increasing unemployment rates from the 1970s to the 1980s were able to decrease their rates significantly by the 1990s, while others have not seen any significant changes in their unemployment rates over the last 40 years.
In attempting to explain Europe's unemployment experience since the 1970s researchers have focused on three different approaches: the effects of adverse economic shocks, the role of labor market institutions, and the interaction between them (see Bean, 1994 , for a survey). Early work using adverse shocks as an explanation includes Blanchard et al. (1986) . The authors argue that, among other factors, a sharp decrease in aggregate demand caused the increase in European unemployment. However, the strong persistence of the unemployment rates suggests that this explanation is not sufficient. Other shocks considered in the literature include technological change, decreasing TFP growth, an increase in the real interest rate, a shift in labor demand, and oil price shocks (see Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000 , for a discussion). While adverse economic shocks are able to explain increases in unemployment rates, most of them affected not only European countries, but the U.S. as well. The question remains why these shocks would lead to such different outcomes in the U.S. and Europe.
Another approach focuses on differences in institutions. The main argument is that European welfare institutions and labor market rigidities are responsible for creating higher unemployment in Europe by distorting the wage structure, incen- 1956 1959 1962 1965 1968 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 tives to work and the propensity of firms to hire workers (see Nickel, 1997 , and Siebert, 1997) . Institutions often held responsible for these labor market rigidities include high levels of employment protection, generous unemployment benefits combined with long entitlement durations, high tax rates, and extensive union powers. There are several problems with this approach. Schettkat (2003) , for example, compares the very different experiences of Germany and the Netherlands. Despite the fact that welfare state institutions in the Netherlands are more generous than in Germany, the Netherlands, unlike Germany, has experienced a declining unemployment rate since the early 1980s. Schettkat concludes that "differences in the incentive structures between the two economies cannot explain the differences in employment success" (p. 771).
Another problem with the institutions approach is that of timing. While most European welfare states have become less generous since the 1970s, unemployment rates have increased over the same period. It is not obvious why institutions that once produced very low levels of unemployment now produce so much higher levels in some countries. Thus, differences in institutions alone cannot explain unemployment differences between Europe and the U.S. (also see Blanchard, 1999) .
The shortcomings of the previous two approaches prompted many researchers to consider the interaction of economic shocks with institutions. This approach is attractive because shocks can potentially explain the general increase in unemployment, while differences in institutions can potentially explain differences in outcomes across countries. Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) and Nunziata (2002) explore the interaction of institutions with macroeconomic shocks such as a decrease in TFP growth, an increase in the real interest rate, and a shift in labor demand.
The institutions they consider include unemployment insurance, employment protection, tax rates, and unionization. Both find that these interactions are able to explain much of the evolution of unemployment across countries and times. However, their estimated effects do not appear to be very robust (Nunziata, p. 37).
Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998), on the other hand, explore the interaction be- My own research adds another, so far little explored, dimension to this literature. I investigate to what degree differences in retraining opportunities are responsible for the divergence of unemployment rates between the U.S. and Europe.
In my model, unemployed workers search for jobs as well as suitable retraining programs. I find that when it becomes more difficult to locate suitable retraining programs, enrollment rates, productivity and the unemployment rate decline. As it becomes harder to find suitable training programs, the value of remaining unemployed decreases, prompting unemployed workers to accept jobs at higher rates.
Productivity declines as fewer low-skilled workers enroll in training programs and upgrade their skill to the higher skill level.
Furthermore, this paper is the first attempt to investigate the role of retraining in economies that are subject to economic turbulences as described by Sargent (1998, 2004) . Using a similar parametrization as Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004) , I find that the generosity of unemployment benefits, the main driving force in their model, is not an important determinant of unemployment, even during tumultuous economic times, if sufficiently good retraining institutions are available.
Economies with more flexible retraining institutions adjust better to economic turbulence, and as a result, feature lower unemployment rates and higher productivity and output. An increase in economic turbulence leads to a decrease in unemployment rates a model calibrated to the European economy, while it leads to a very slight increase in unemployment in the U.S. economy. Economies in which unemployed workers have the ability to retrain feature lower unemployment rates than similar non-training economies. As economic turbulence increases, retraining becomes less attractive and the probability of finding a suitable training opportunity decreases, leading to a decline in the value of being unemployed. As a result, the job finding rate in the training economies increases with turbulence, leading to a lower unemployment rate than in non-training economies.
These results suggest that differences in retraining institutions might play an important role in explaining cross-country differences in unemployment rates. Countries with more widely available retraining opportunities should have adjusted better to turbulence and feature lower unemployment rates. My results also suggest that economic turbulence as modeled by Ljungqvist and Sargent cannot fully explain the divergence of unemployment rates between the U.S. and Europe.
Retraining
In this section, I present different proxies for retraining in OECD countries and re- 
Some Facts
There is tremendous heterogeneity across OECD countries with respect to retraining. The United States and Europe not only differ in enrollment rates, but also in the intensity of retraining programs. As Table 1 shows, U.S. workers enroll in part-time programs at a much higher rate than European workers do. Some countries, such as France, Germany, and Italy, seem to only have full-time programs for adults. To get an idea of whether countries that have high retraining rates are also those with low unemployment rates, I calculated correlations between the aggregate unemployment rates and the proxies for retraining discussed above. The results are presented in Table 3 . For each proxy, aggregate unemployment rates are negatively correlated with retraining; that is, more retraining is associated with lower unemployment rates. The correlations between unemployment rates and some of these proxies are quite high, ranging from -0.06 to -0.60. Although these correlations do not imply causality, they do suggest that retraining may have a positive effect on the aggregate unemployment rate. The presented evidence suggests that retraining institutions in the U.S. are more flexible than in Europe. The data show that there are large differences in enrollment rates, which might also imply that the variety of retraining programs, and the associated career paths, is much larger in the U.S.
The higher enrollment rate in part-time programs suggests that U.S. workers have more flexibility of when to attend training classes. Furthermore, there are also large differences in retraining across European countries, suggesting that differences in retraining opportunities might help explain cross-country differences in unemployment rates.
Literature
Much of the literature on retraining the unemployed has concentrated on evaluating active labor market programs (ALMP) in which unemployed workers participate in government-provided training programs, often as a condition for the renewal of entitlements to unemployment benefits (e.g. see Calmfors, 1995 at a fixed rate. Workers do not lose skills while being employed. Furthermore, each employer has access to a retraining technology and can retrain a worker at some cost. When an active job seeker and a firm with a vacancy meet, they both observe the job seeker's current skill level. Either the firm or the worker may reject the potential match and continue search. If they desire to form a match, the worker and firm negotiate over the wage, the amount of training and the worker's contribution to training costs. Upon reaching an agreement, both parties leave the market for good. In equilibrium, workers whose skills are below a certain cut-off will never be hired and are unemployable. They stop looking for work. All other workers reach immediate agreement with employers and get trained to the highest level of skill. Coles and Masters suggest that governments should offer positive unemployment benefits to ensure that very low-skilled workers do not search for jobs and thus do not generate negative congestion externalities on the matching rates of higher skilled workers. The positive depreciation of skills implies that governments should subsidize vacancy creation. However, because of the lack of externalities associated with retraining, governments should not subsidize training.
These conclusions heavily depend on how the authors model retraining. If workers could retrain prior to meeting a firm in the matching market, as they can in my model, all three conclusions would probably be overturned. In that case, very low-skilled workers would receive retraining until they were employable. Furthermore, governments should probably subsidize retraining to some extent, since it would increase the rate at which workers find new jobs. The case for subsidizing vacancy creation over retraining might be further weakened if low and high-skilled workers were in different labor markets and would not compete for the same jobs. However, starting in the 1980s, technological change accelerated and countries that put a greater emphasis on general skill acquisition, such as the U.S., experienced higher growth rates. The key assumption in their model is that only workers with general education are able to operate new production technologies, whereas vocationally trained workers are more efficient in operating established technologies but are unable to operate new ones. In their model, newly born workers make an irreversible choice about what kind of education to receive. Acquiring general education is more costly than acquiring specific skills, but operating newer, more productive technologies is also associated with higher wages. Firms may choose to operate using a well-understood, commonly available technology for which they can hire workers with specific skills. Alternatively, firms may decide to adopt cutting edge technologies at some cost but have to employ workers with general skills.
Krueger and Kumar show that as the rate of newly available technologies increases, countries that emphasize vocational training could experience slower growth rates.
Although their paper is not directly related to my work, one could reinterpret the idea that vocationally educated workers cannot operate new machinery as the absence of retraining opportunities. In this case, rapid technological progress, which in my model is equivalent to an increase in economic turbulence, could lead to a decrease in growth rates because workers are unable to keep up with technological advances.
Model
I adopt a standard Diamond (1982) , Mortensen (1982) and Pissarides (1990) matching model and extend it to allow for worker heterogeneity and retraining of the unemployed. The basic set-up is similar to Den Haan, Haefke and Ramey (2004) and Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004) . In this environment, time is discrete and the economy is populated by a constant measure one of risk-neutral workers who can obtain two different skill levels k, where k = h denotes high skills and k = l low skills.
Each period a measure of ρ workers retires and a measure of ρ workers enters the work force with low skills. Workers have two options to upgrade their skills: (1) they can become employed and face a probability γ U of an upgrade to the high skill level or (2) they can enroll in training programs at per period cost τ while being unemployed and face a probability γ T of upgrading their skill. Employment relationships break up exogenously with probability s. Upon separation, high-skilled workers lose their skills with probability γ D . In every period, unemployed workers are eligible for unemployment benefits b j , where the level of benefits depends on the workers' last earnings so that j denotes the skill level before entering the unemployment pool. Workers must spend a minimum of one period in a high skilled-job in order to be eligible for high unemployment benefits. There are four groups of workers, each one characterized by its skill level and benefit entitlement, (k, j):
(1) low-skilled workers entitled to low unemployment benefits ((l, l) workers), (2) formerly high-skilled workers who experienced a skill downgrade upon lay-off and are entitled to high benefits ((l, h) workers), (3) formerly low-skilled workers who just upgraded to the high skill level and are entitled to low benefits ((h, l) workers), and (4) high-skilled workers entitled to high benefits ((h, h) workers).
Production requires an employment relationship between one worker and one firm who produce output z per period. After meeting in the matching market, new worker-firm pairs choose to accept or reject their matches after observing their ini-
Bargaining is efficient, so that workers and firms aim to maximize their joint surplus. The division of match surplus is determined by Nash bargain, where the workers' bargaining weight is φ.
Matching Market
New matches are formed according to a standard Cobb-Douglas matching function worker is given by
is the vacancy-unemployment ratio. The probability that an unemployed worker matches with a firm is
After a match is formed, the initial productivity draw z is observed. Any draw above the cut-off level z * k,j , i.e z ≥ z * k,j , is acceptable, and an employment relationship is formed. For draws below the cut-off it is in the mutual interest of both parties to continue searching for a better match. The measure of acceptable jobs is
A firm successfully hires a skill k worker if it matched with a worker and the productivity draw is sufficiently high. The probability of hiring a worker is thus given by
Workers find new jobs at rate
The job finding rate could potentially be greater than one, which would be a problem in this model. However, in my numerical simulations, the job finding rate is always within the interval [0, 1].
Joint Surplus
Let E k,j (z) denote the value a {k, j} worker receives from being employed, U k,j the worker's value of being unemployed, and J k,j (z) a firm's value of a filled job. The joint surplus from an employment relationship is the sum of the worker's surplus, E k,j (z) − U k,j , and the firm's surplus, J k,j (z). For a {k, j} worker, the joint surplus is thus
I assume that firms can freely enter this economy so that the value of a vacancy is zero in equilibrium. The cut-off z * k,j is the level of productivity at which the joint surplus of an employment relationship is zero. Since bargaining results in an efficient allocation, workers and firms aim to maximize the joint surplus and would reject any productivity that would result in negative surplus. The reservation productivity z * k,j is the solution to
Firms
A firm's value of a filled job J k,j is given by the produced output z and the expected present value of continuing the employment relationship less the wage w k,j (z) it has to pay the worker. For a {l, j} firm, a firm that hires low skilled workers who are entitled to either low (j = l) or high (j = h) unemployment benefits, this value is given by
For the remainder of the paper I will denoteJ k,j andĒ k,j as the conditional expectations of J k,j (z) and E k,j (z), respectively, given that z ≥ z * h,l . The time discount factor β = (1 − ρ)/(1 + r) includes the probability of surviving to the next period, (1−ρ). A filled job turns into a vacancy with probability s. If the employment relationship continues, the worker either receives a skill upgrade with probability γ U or remains at the current low skill level with probability 1−γ U . After a skill upgrade a worker receives a new productivity draw from the distribution G h (z). An assumption I maintain throughout this paper is that upgraded workers always receive productivity draws above the new cut-off level. This assumption ensures that upgraded workers are not at risk of becoming unemployed. Even after a skill upgrade the worker-firm relationship is maintained. The firm thus expects to receiveJ h,l with probability γ U instead of its current value J l,j (z). Similarly, the value of a filled job for a {h, j} firm is given by
Before a firm can hire any worker, it is required to post a vacancy at cost c k,j .
The assumption that firms can enter freely implies that firms expect to earn zero profits from posting a vacancy in equilibrium. The associate equilibrium condition is given by
This equilibrium condition states that the expected benefit of a vacancy, given by βh(x k,j )J k,j , equals the cost of posting it, c k,j .
Workers
A {k, j} worker can either be employed and receive a value of E k,j (z) or be unemployed and receive U k,j . In addition, low-skilled unemployed workers may enroll in retraining programs, receiving a value of R j . A {l, j} worker's value of being employed is given by
Both types of low-skilled workers have similar continuation values because {l, h} workers lose their entitlements to high unemployment benefits after working one period as low skilled workers. For {h, j} workers, the value of being employed is
Again, the continuation value for both types of high skilled workers are similar because {h, l} workers become eligible for high benefits after one period of employment.
Unemployed workers receive unemployment benefits b j and search for new jobs. Benefits depend on the workers' last earnings. As a simplification I take b j = δw j,j , where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the replacement ratio andw j,j denotes the average wage
Low-skilled unemployed workers also search for suitable training programs that allow them to upgrade their skills. Unemployed workers always take acceptable job offers. Only when they have not receive any acceptable job offers will they consider enrolling in training programs. The value of a {l, j} worker of being unemployed is given by
where o j ∈ [0, 1] represents the quality of the training opportunity. With probabil-
this opportunity is better than the threshold o * j and the worker enrolls in the training program and expects to receiveR j , whereR j is the conditional
The value of a {h, j} worker of being unemployed is given by
Training
As mentioned above, low-skilled unemployed workers may choose to enroll in training programs at a per period cost τ to upgrade from low to high skill levels.
Every period, unemployed workers learn about training opportunities. Once an acceptable opportunity is found and a worker enrolls in the training program, there is a probability γ T that her efforts will be successful. With probability 1 − γ T retraining will be unsuccessful and the worker will remain low-skilled.
A worker's value of retraining, R j (o j ), is given by
I assume that enrolled workers continue to receive unemployment benefits. When a worker successfully upgrades her skill, she receives the continuation value of a high skilled unemployed worker, U h,j − b j , in the next period. If the retraining is unsuccessful, the worker receives the continuation value of a low-skilled worker in the next period, with one difference. I interpret a draw of o j ≥ o * j by an enrolled worker as remaining in the current training program. In this case, the worker will receive exactly the same value, e.g. R j (o j ) and notR j . Hence, workers search for employment while being enrolled and decide whether to drop out or not, i.e. they do not necessarily have to spend time being unemployed in order to find a job. The total cost of retraining is τ /o j , where τ can be interpreted as a tuition cost. Total cost is inversely related to the quality of the training opportunity. If o j = 1, the education program is a perfect fit for the worker and the only remaining cost is τ .
If o j < 1, the opportunity is a less than perfect fit and implies a worker's lower willingness to take up retraining. In the model, this lower willingness is equivalent to a higher cost of retraining.
The expected surplus from enrolling in a retraining program is given by
Workers enroll in retraining courses if they expect to receive positive surplus from enrolling. The cut-off level o * j of acceptable jobs is then defined as the solution to
Transition Equations
In this section I present the steady-state equations for the different groups of unemployed, employed, and enrolled workers. There are four unemployment groups, four employment groups, and two enrollment groups, which are denoted by u l,l , tering the e l,l or e h,h groups directly. The differences in productivity arise from differences in acceptance rates, i.e. these workers require higher (or lower) productivity draws in order to accept job offers. However, for the sake of simplicity I abstract from these differences as the flow of these workers is very small so that the results would not be affected. The main points of the following exercises would be unchanged. Each of the following steady-state equations has the same format, with inflows on the left and outflows on the right.
The u l,l state:
The flow into the u l,l state consists of two groups. The first one includes lowskilled employed workers who lost their jobs, while the second group consists of workers in retraining who did not upgrade to the high skill level, did not find jobs as low-skilled workers and were unable to find other suitable training opportunities.
I make the assumption that enrolled workers search for jobs and new retraining opportunities in every period. If they do not upgrade to the higher skill level, but instead find an acceptable job, they take it over any retraining opportunity 1 The u l,h state:
The u h,l state:
The u h,h state:
The e l,l state:
The e l,h state:
Note that workers can spend at most one period in the e l,h or e h,l state. After one period they either retire, lose their job, or transition into the e l,l or e h,h groups, respectively.
The e h,l state:
The e h,h state:
The r l state:
The r h state:
Calibration
In shows that these estimates lie at the upper end of estimates for the elasticity of matching with respect to unemployment. Finally, I set γ T = 0.04 and the distribution of training opportunities to be uniformly distributed over the unit interval.
Conditional on not leaving the training program, it takes on average 25 months to upgrade to the higher skill level. This is four times faster than upgrading on the job. A summary of these parameters can be found in Table 4 .
Country Specific Parameters
In Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) the U.S. "laissez-faire" economy and the Euro- The separation rate is another important difference between the two economies. Table 6 .
In order to compare the training and non-training economies, I calibrate a version of my model without retraining in the same way described above. However, calibrating the training and non-training economies to the same unemployment rates requires different matching probabilities for the non-training economies. I set the workers' matching probabilities to 37 percent (U.S.) and 26 percent (Europe).
The resulting parameters of this calibration can also be found in Table 6 . In the model with a 3.5 percent separation rate, the unemployment rate increases to 5.7 percent. Even when increasing the benefit replacement rate to 60 percent, an increase in turbulence has hardly any effect on the unemployment rate.
Ljungqvist and Sargent Revisited
The effects become considerably larger when using a 70 percent replacement ratio. With a 2 percent separation rate, an increase in the turbulence from 10 percent to 50 percent increases the unemployment rate to 7.53 percent. This is an increase comparable to that in Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998). However, when taking a separation rate of 1 percent the unemployment rate increases to only 6.00 percent.
This compares to an increases to 5.70 percent for a separation rate of 3.5 percent and a replacement ratio of 50 percent.
This exercise shows that an increase in turbulence as modeled by Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998, 2004 ) might have a more adverse effect on the U.S. economy than on the European economy because job churning is much higher in the U.S. In fact, the tables suggest that under reasonable assumptions for the European economy, such as a replacement ratio of 50 or 60 percent and separation rates between 0.5 and 1.5 percent, the effect of an increase in economic turbulence on unemployment rates is negligible. Even for replacement rates of 70 percent, the effect of turbulence is very small for separation rates below 2 percent and skill loss probabilities below 50 percent.
Retraining the Unemployed
To shed light on the effects of retraining I contrast the steady states of the U.S. and
European economies with and without training in Table 8 . It should not come as a surprise that the measure of high-skilled workers in the training economies is between 1.4 percent (Europe) and 11.0 percent (U.S.) larger than in the non-training economies. At the same time, the measure of low-skilled workers in the training economies is between 8.8 percent (Europe) and 27.7 percent (U.S.) smaller than in the non-training economies. It follows that the ratio of high-skilled to low-skilled workers is between 11.1 percent (Europe) and 53.5 percent higher in the training economies. Also note that the European non-training economy features a higher skill-ratio than the U.S. training economy, a result of differences in the separation rate and replacement ratio. While the average job tenure in the U.S. economy is only about 2 years and 5 months, it is 8 years and 4 months in the European economy. Since it takes workers on average 8 years and 4 months to upgrade their skills to the higher level, conditional on not being laid-off, there are relatively more high-skilled workers in Europe. In addition, due to the higher unemployment benefit replacement ratio, European workers are more selective about which jobs to accept, which translates into higher productivity. In my model, high-skilled workers' productivity draws are on average twice as high as those for low-skilled workers. As a result of differences in the skill composition, average productivity is between 4.8 percent (Europe) and 7.4 percent (U.S.)
higher in the training economies. Since productivity and wages are directly linked, average wages are also higher in the training economies. The higher average productivity results in higher GDP, despite the fact that overall employment is lower in the training economies.
All workers have lower job acceptance rates in the training economies. The availability of training programs for low-skilled unemployed workers increases the value of being unemployed just like an increase in unemployment benefits. An increase in the value of being unemployed induces workers to be more selective about which job offers to accept, leading to a decline in the acceptance rate and job finding rate, but an increase in productivity. A decrease in the acceptance rate implies a decrease in the job finding rate, given that the matching probability remains unchanged. In my calibration exercise I had to choose different matching probabilities for the different economies. While the acceptance rate of job offers is lower in the training economies, some of the job finding rates are actually higher due to differences in the matching probabilities. Given the change in incentives for low-skilled workers to accept jobs, it is not surprising that their unemployment rates are higher in the training economies with an increase from 14.3 to 23.0 percent in Europe and an increase from 15.8 to 17.7 percent in the U.S.
The unemployment rates for high-skilled workers decreases from 8.7 percent in the European non-training economy to 6.5 percent in the training economy. In the U.S. the high-skilled unemployment rate hardly changes, decreasing from 12.9 to 12.5 percent. These decreases are the result of the higher matching rate in the training economy. 
Results
In this section I present some results comparing the training and non-training 
Changes in Enrollment
To illustrate the effects a change in enrollment has on my economies, I use the calibrated values reported in Tables 4 and 6 
Changes in Economic Turbulence
An increase in economic turbulence has a devastating effect on the welfare state in initially increases in both economies. As γ D increases, the benefit of being a highskilled worker declines because of the greater likelihood of skill loss, decreasing the value of retraining. However, the large increase in the measure of low-skilled unemployed workers associated with the increase in turbulence increases the pool of potential enrollees. The measure of low-skilled workers initially increases faster than the probability of finding a suitable training opportunity declines. Consequently, enrollment increases at first, but decreases at higher levels of turbulence. of retraining decreases and hence the value of being unemployed. As a result, low-skilled workers are more eager to find employment. On the other hand, highskilled workers' incentives to find work decrease with more economic turbulence.
A decline in the job finding rate in both the training and non-training economies is the result.
Average productivity at the calibration point is between 4.8 (Europe) and 7.3 percent (U.S.) higher in the training economies than in the non-training economies (see Figures 6 and 7) . As economic turbulence increases, the difference in productivity also increases at first, but decreasing at higher levels of turbulence. Note that the difference in productivity between the training and non-training economies is closely related to the evolution of enrollment rates.
In the European economy, an increase in turbulence has almost no effect on the difference in average productivity. Due to the lower separation rate, most of the skills are acquired on-the-job and the number of workers who upgrade through in the non-training economy. In the U.S., GDP and after tax wage income also decline faster in the non-training economies. This is due to an increase in the unemployment rate between the training and the non-training economy.
In my model, an increase in economic turbulence has a much different effect on a European calibrated economy than in Sargent (1998, 2004 
Conclusion
In this paper I explored to what degree differences in retraining opportunities are responsible for the divergence of unemployment rates between the U.S. and Europe. In my model, an increase in training opportunities for low-skilled workers increases productivity, but it also increases unemployment. The reason is that workers have to search for suitable training programs. Increasing the probability of finding retraining opportunities increases the value of remaining unemployed and thus reduces the job finding rate, which leads to an increase in the unemployment rate.
Economic turbulence decreases the value of retraining and thus the value of being unemployed. The result is a decrease in the unemployment rate. Ljungqvist and Sargent pointed out a promising channel to explain the divergence of unemployment rates between Europe and the U.S. since the early 1980s. As I showed in Section 5, their result is not very robust to changes in their parametrization. Furthermore, I show that the generosity of unemployment benefits, the main driving force in their model, is not an important determinant of unemployment, even during tumultuous economic times, if sufficiently good retraining institutions are available.
My results suggest that retraining might be important in two ways. Giving unemployed workers the opportunity to upgrade their skills increases productivity, but also changes their incentive structure. Of course, my result depend much on the fact that only unemployed workers are allow to retrain. Allowing low-skilled employed workers to retrain as well might alter my results.
Further research should investigate the importance of general versus specific training. As Krueger and Kumar (2004) argue, European economies rely much more heavily on vocational, or specific skill education, while the U.S. economy relies more on general skill acquisition. This might play an important role in explaining the different evolution of unemployment rates between the U.S. and Europe.
Appendix
In this appendix, I will explain how I calculated the separation rates from the OECD data and provide definitions for the OECD classification of education levels.
Calculating Separation Rates
I calculated the job-finding and separation rates from OECD data on average unemployment durations. Using average duration data might introduce two biases if the average is calculated using interrupted unemployment spells. These biases stem from (1) counting unemployment spells not yet completed and (2) undersampling short completed unemployment spells. While these are well-known problems with the U.S. duration data, it is not clear that the same issues apply to data from other countries presented in the table. I disregard these differences and adjust all data for these biases by calculating the job finding rate as 2/(average duration of unemployment). I then assume that the economies were in a steady-state in which the aggregate unemployment rate is given by u = s s + f Knowing f , the job finding rate, and u, the aggregate unemployment rate, I can calculate the separation rate s as
While this yields a relative accurate estimate for the U.S., it is probably an upper bound for all other countries.
OECD Education Categories
Upper Secondary: Upper secondary education may either be preparatory, i.e.
preparing students for tertiary education or terminal, i.e. preparing the students for entry directly into working life .
Post-Secondary Non-Tertiary: Post-secondary non-tertiary educational programmes straddle the boundary between upper secondary and post-secondary education from an international point of view, even though they might clearly be considered upper secondary or post-secondary programmes in a national context.
Although their content may not be significantly more advanced than upper secondary programmes, they serve to broaden the knowledge of participants who have already gained an upper secondary qualification. The students tend to be older than those enrolled at the upper secondary level. Tertiary B: Tertiary-type B programmes are typically shorter than those of tertiary-type A and focus on practical, technical or occupational skills for direct entry into the labour market, although some theoretical foundations may be covered in the respective programmes. They have a minimum duration of two years fulltime equivalent at the tertiary level.
Source: OECD

